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Introduction
Walls are distinct, man-made features o f  an environm ent, and to the extent that 
they block our way or our vision they are impossible to ignore. As such they are 
inherently in need o f  an explanation. Yet walls can be built with many purposes in 
m ind and serve several functions, and functions, moreover, are likely to vary over 
time. A tall, solid wall appears impassable in its concrete concreteness, yet walls, 
no m atter how high, are never actually all that daunting. If  we keep on moving, 
keep on exploring, we will sooner or later find a way around, across or under them; 
a gate wi 11 be found ajar, a tower unm anned or a guard who can be bribed (Lattim ore 
1962b: 486). Walls in the end are nothing in them selves and only som ething as a 
part o f  a tactic, but tactics often change -  for technological, political or cultural 
reasons and the walls, as a result, w ill be rendered obsolete and useless. Walls are 
not final conclusions as much as tem porary statements awaiting refutation. As a 
result, walls will tell us a lot about the outlook o f  the societies that built them. 
Walls tell stories about presum ptions and prem onitions, fears and ambitions; about 
who we take ourselves to be and how we relate to others. Yet as far as storytellers 
go, they are annoyingly silent. Walls cannot talk; they stonewall us; and it does not 
help if  we plead with, or wail before, them.
Take the case o f  the Great Wall o f  China (W aldron 1983; Waldron 1992; Lovell 
2007; Huang 2012). As history textbooks explain, the Great Wall was built to keep 
the barbarians at bay. North o f  the wall, on the enorm ous steppes o f  inner Asia, 
w as where the nom ads lived with their grazing herds. It was here that Chinese­
speaking peoples, som etim e in prehistory, came to stop in their gradual northward 
expansion. The nom ads were a constant threat to the new  arrivals, and this, the 
textbooks tell us, was why the Great Wall was built. The wall would protect 
the crops and lives o f  the Chinese farmers, and it w ould protect their culture too. 
Culture is often said to require walls; culture, after all, refers to ‘cultivation’, to the 
‘tilling o f  the land’. Just as walls are built to protect crops, they are built to protect 
a culture from w hatever com es towards it from the outside - foreign influences, 
barbarian hordes, the winds o f  change. This is how Chinese people alw ays have 
defended them selves, the first European visitors to China concluded; the Chinese 
are inherently a wall-building people and the Great Wall is their ‘piece de resis­
tance’. It was by limiting trade and keeping the country secure that the Chinese
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protected itierr wealth ana their way o f  life. We have no use for Facebook and 
Twitter, as today’s Chinese leaders explain when implementing the ‘Golden Shield 
Project1, intended to protect their culture, and their people, from the rest o f  the 
Internet. Appropriately enough, the policy is com m only referred to as the ‘fdnghud 
changcheng ‘the Great Firewall o f  C hina’.2
This agricultural m ind-set contrasts sharply with that o f  a comm ercial economy. 
As Adam Sm ith explained, a nation is wealthy not because it has gathered a lot 
o f  treasure but because o f  what it can produce. Productivity requires specialis­
ation and specialisation requires exchange. The larger the market, and the more 
unim peded the exchange, the more far-reaching the division o f  labour and. ceteris 
paribus, the more productive we become. Walls, from this point o f  view, are an 
abomination. Walls do not keep our wealth in but they keep exchange out; they 
limit the division o f  labour and they lower productivity. Moreover, walls block 
access to new ideas, to the latest technological advances, medical discoveries and 
scientific breakthroughs. Walls, in short, limit access to civilisation. Thus, while 
culture m ay require walls to be erected, civilisation requires wfalls to come dowrn. 
As a result, a country that hides behind walls can never be civilised (R ingm ar 
201 lb: 5-32). This is why China is so backward, Europeans cam e to conclude in 
the nineteenth century, once free-trade doctrines had becom e the official wisdom 
in Europe. This is why C hina's econom y has stalled and wrhy Chinese people are 
so ignorant, so secretive and so corrupt. And this is also why the country seem ed 
to be perpetually stuck in the past tense. History, the Europeans pointed out, is a 
m atter o f  progress, but since nothing in China ever changes, China, per definition, 
is history-less (Mill 1859: 413). The Great Wall w as the perfect symbol o f  this 
stationary mind-set, and. what w as particularly infuriating to the Europeans, the 
Chinese utterly failed to understand the nature o f  the predicament they were in. ‘[I]f 
they are ever to be further im proved,’ as John Stuart M ill concluded in On Liberty 
in 1859, referring to the Chinese, ‘it must be by foreigners’ (Mill 1859: 129). The 
assistance that China so urgently required was given in the First and the Second 
Opium Wars, 1839-42 and 1856-60, respectively. Positioning their rifled ordnance 
facing China’s wfalls, the Chinese were forced to open up to the outside world 
(R ingm ar201 la: 273-98; Ringmar 2013). Soon European goods and ideas flooded 
in, spreading civilisation while destroying Chinese culture and uprooting its people.
Considering all that we think we knowf about the Great Wall o f  China, it is 
surprising to learn that there is no such thing. T hat’s right -  the Great Wall o f  China 
does not exist. There are certainly many walls scattered across the plains o f  northern 
China, and bits o f  walls, and rem nants o f  form er walls, but there is no ‘Great Wall 
o f  China’ understood as a unified project constructed at a particular time and with 
a particular object in mind. The Great Wall is not a physical as much as a social 
construction. Yet what is constructed can be deconstructed, and such deconstruc- 
tion is what we will engage in here. As we will discover, the irony, and the tragedy, 
is that the Great Wall o f  China, and the wall-building mind-set o f  the Chinese, 
existed nowhere else but in the imagination o f  the Europeans. The Great Wall 
justified admiration as long as walls wrere admired, but once walls cam e to be seen 
as an abomination, it became a pretext for European imperialism.
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Wall building in China
Despite its ethnic and linguistic diversity, the Chinese em pire was always, officially 
at least, based on only one socio-econom ic m odel (Lattim ore 1962b, 4 6 9 -9 1). The 
subjects o f  the em peror were all farmers who worked on small plots o f  land, 
grow ing millet in the north and rice in the south. To com pensate for the dearth 
o f  land, they supplied other factors o f  production; notably their own labour and 
that o f  their family members, but they also relied heavily on artificial irrigation 
and on fertilisers. The imperial state glorified the farm ers while exploiting them 
for corvee labour and taxes. It is the farmers who feed us all, Confucian rhe­
toric proclaimed, and farming is the only truly productive occupation. Vet as each 
dynasty was acutely aware, their ability to maintain them selves in power depended 
more than anything on their ability to keep the farmers in their places.
There was an obvious geographical limit to the feasibility o f  this socio-economic 
m odel (Lattim ore 1962b: 477-81). On the steppes o f  Rurasia -  covering much o f  
the landmass from north-west o f  Beijing all the way to Hungary -  there w as not 
enough rainfall to sustain agriculture, few large rivers and no m eans o f  irrigation. 
This was instead where the nom ads lived. Although the clim ate was arid, there was 
plenty o f  grass on which their anim als could feed and the nom ads com pensated for 
the lack o f  water by m eans o f  other factors o f  production -  notably land, which was 
over-abundant. When the grass in one pasture had run out they sim ply moved to 
another pasture. The pastoral economy, to put it differently, was highly specialised. 
Since the nom ads produced only what they were best at producing -  meat, wool, 
horses -  they required others to provide them with everything else that they needed 
(Khazanov 1994). That is, they had to trade, o r failing that they reserved the right 
to raid their fanning neighbours. The perennial problem o f  imperial Chinese 
history, from the third century BCE onwards, w as how to deal w ith this recurring 
m enace. There were three main options: to subdue the nom ads by offensive m ili­
tary means; to concede to their dem ands and involve them in exchange; o r to repel 
them by m eans o f  defensive arrangem ents, including walls (W aldron 1992: 55-6).
The first option, a m ilitary offensive, was never going to be easy. The terrain that 
separated the Chinese heartlands from the steppes was flat and open and difficult 
to defend. Moreover, the nom ads were the vastly more efficient warriors. They 
only had cavalry, no infantry or supply train, and they were highly mobile. As a 
result, they could quickly assem ble in force at a certain location, make a strike or 
a breech, and then just as quickly disperse again. O r they could outflank an enemy 
who cam e m arching tow ards them and attack them from the rear. M oreover, since 
they had no particular territory to defend, the nom ads did not differentiate bet­
ween offensive and defence warfare. To retreat was not hum iliating, but instead an 
opportunity to outrun, or am bush, any imperial soldiers who pursued them. The 
only way to defeat such an enemy, the Chinese eventually discovered, was to learn 
to fight in the same m anner (W aldron 1992). But for this to be possible the Chinese 
needed a powerful, horse-based, arm y guided by entirely different tactics than pre­
viously and they needed knowledge o f  the steppe and its people. The Tang dynasty. 
618-907  CE, was successful in this regard, but they were fam ously open to outside
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influences and foreign ideas (LoveH 2007 :13$  47). The Yuan dynasty  <271-1368 
CE, and the Qing dynasty, 1644-1912, were also good at dealing with the nom ads 
but the Yuan em perors were M ongols and the Qing emperors were M anchu -  both 
peoples with their origin on the steppes.
The second option, trade, w as much what the nom ads them selves would have 
preferred, and this w as also what they repeatedly requested (Waldron 1992: 17 8 -  
82). In the eyes o f  the Chinese authorities, however, trade was not understood as 
an opportunity but instead as a concession. We have everything a person might 
require within our own borders, Confucian scholars argued, and therefore we 
never have to leave our country; foreigners, by contrast, come here since they have 
needs that cannot be fulfilled at home. The Chinese traded with these visitors, but 
above all out o f  a sense o f  m agnanim ity and in order to bring them into their own 
cultural sphere. Trade, the Chinese hoped, would transform the ‘raw ’ barbarians 
into ‘cooked’ barbarians (Fiskesjtf, 1999: 139 68). Such condescension was not 
appreciated by the peoples o f  the steppe and in any case, as they explained, they 
needed far more goods than the Chinese were prepared to supply (Waldron 1992: 
176-7). Since the nom ads were able to back up their dem ands with force, and the 
Chinese authorities were in a weak position, one concession would easily lead 
to another and before long the imperial authorities would be com pletely at the 
nom ads’ mercy. This, at least, is what Confucian hardliners at court argued. 
‘The situation o f  the em pire may be described as like that o f  a person hanging 
upside dow n’ (M em orial by Jia Yi o f  the Han dynasty, quoted in Waldron 1992: 
41). Perversely, the nom ads were on top and the Chinese were at the bottom.
The third, defensive, alternative, which included w all-building, was the fall­
back option (Waldron 1992: 57-8). This is what you did if  you were too weak or 
too timid to go on the offensive and too proud to trade. Defence was no one’s 
favourite option but instead what you ended up doing when you did not know what 
to do. Although w alls were unlikely to stop an invader, there was a variety o f  other 
roles they could play. In fact, from a m ilitary point o f  view, wal Is are best understood 
not as m eans o f  excluding an enem y as much as m an-m ade obstacles that can help 
reshape the layout o f  a battlefield (Waldron 1992: 45; cf. Lovell 2007: 47-65). 
Walls are like speed bum ps in a road, designed to slow down an enemy, and thereby 
structures along which arm ies can be organised. In this respect, they are more 
sim ilar to ram parts or trenches. M oreover, in m any cases walls were built mainly 
as a m eans o f  connecting already existing m ilitary installations to  each other, 
m aking it possible to m ove troops securely from one position to the next. O r you 
could place your troops outside o f  the wall and use it as a  way to protect your Hank. 
In addition to these m ilitary uses, walls m ade powerful political statements. A 
wall, even a scalable one, is a manifestation o f  power. Powerful rulers have power­
ful w alls and the walls o f  the em peror o f  China had to be very impressive indeed
-  at least the walls built in places where people were most likely to see them. In 
addition, walls can be constructed as a way to  stake out a claim ; in order to let 
everyone know how far our imperial am bitions reach and what we one day would 
like to accom plish. And walls, quite obviously, can serve to keep people in -  such 
as any oppressed Chinese peasants, tired o f  taxes and unpaid labour, who might
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consider taking op a freer fife on the steppes (Lattim ore 1962a: 34(5ft'.; Laltinrore 
1962b: 484). As a result o f  this mix o f  m ilitary and political aims, w alls can at the 
same tim e be part o f  a defensive and an offensive strategy.
It was for such a variety o f  reasons that walls came to be constructed in northern 
China already in the sixth century BCE, and why walls intermittently were construc­
ted by any dynasty that failed to come up with other ways o f  dealing with the 
nomads. Qin Shihuang, the First Emperor, in the third century BCE, w as one such 
w all-builder but his walls were made o f  mud and they quickly deteriorated (Waldron 
1992: 195-202). Subsequent dynasties occasionally embarked on similar projects, 
but most o f  them did not. There were no walls to stop the M ongols from invading 
China in the 1270s and when M arco Polo returned to Venice in 1295, and started 
telling his stories o f  the wonders o f  the East, he said nothing about any walls. It 
was instead only in the latter part o f  the M ing dynasty, in the 1580s, that m ajor wall 
construction begun in earnest (Waldron 1992: 140-64). The issue here concerned 
control over the Ordos, the land encircled by a vast loop in the Yellow River, 
strategically located just west o f  Beijing. Given its arid climate, the Ordos loop 
should really have belonged to the nomads, but the presence o f  the Yellow River 
meant that at least some o f  the region could be irrigated and thereby farmed and 
accessible to the Chinese socio-econom ic model. M oreover, holding this land was 
o f  a param ount m ilitary importance -  the capital, after all, had to be defended from 
the nomadic threat (Lattim ore 1962a: 462).
And yet, in the sixteenth century, the nom ads moved into the Ordos. The imperial 
court reacted with alarm and an extensive discussion ensued am ong the em peror's 
advisors regarding what to do (Waldron 1992:91-139). Some advocated an offen­
sive m ilitary strategy, others advocated concessions and trade, and in the stalemate 
that ensued, the defensive, wall-building, strategy w as agreed on. It was a com pro­
mise, a plan B, which had more to do with the internal politics o f  the court than 
with m ilitary expediency, and even now, during the late Ming, there was no con­
certed policy to build a ‘Great WalP. In the historical sources repeated references 
are instead m ade to the ‘N ine Defence A reas', a series o f  nine heavily armed 
sectors spanning the strategic northern border (Farm er 2009:463). In line with this 
policy walls were built at strategic locations such as at Badaling, north-west 
o f  Beijing, today the m ost popular location for visits to ‘the Great WalP. But 
w alls wrere also constructed as a m eans o f  linking up already existing fortifications 
around the Ordos loop, although m any o f  these were rampart m ade o f  mud. That 
these constructions were insufficient to provide protection was clear in 1644, if  not 
before, when the assem bly o f  w alls was no match for the invading M anchus.
How the Great Wall was constructed
It was instead in Europe, not in China, that the Great Wall wfas constructed. It wras 
built, beginning in the seventeenth century, in the m inds o f  European readers o f  the 
letters which Jesuit m issionaries had begun sending back (M ungello 1989; Porter 
2002: 78-132). The Jesuits were in China to convert the Chinese to Christianity, but 
once they realised the impossibility o f  winning converts one by one, they decided
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instead to start at the top. By presenting them selves as purveyors o f  Luropean 
knowledge -  above all concerning astronomy, cartography and the arts -  they 
managed to ingratiate them selves with the emperor. For some 150 years there were 
Jesuits stationed at the imperial court, and although they never managed to interest 
the em peror in their religion, they regularly sent letters back to Europe describing 
their strenuous efforts. Their strategy w'as to tap into well-established European 
conceptions regarding China as a land o f  endless w onders (Cf. Barrow 1804: 
30-1 ). Given that China is such a rich and rem arkable country, was the not-too- 
subtle subtext, our work, even if  occasionally thwarted, will eventually be worth 
the while. One o f  the prime exam ples o f  wondrousncss was what the Europeans 
cam e to refer to as ‘the Great WalP.
One o f  the first tasks the Jesuits em barked on was to m ake a m ap o f  the Chinese 
empire. Die early eighteenth century was when European countries finally came 
to take on a definite geographical shape (Harley 2009: 129-48). From this tim e a 
state was more than anything a territorially bounded entity, its borders distinctly 
dem arcated from others and clearly indicated on a map. China too, the Jesuits 
decided, should be portrayed in the same fashion, and between 1707 and 1717 
a contingent o f  them em barked on a journey into the steppes o f  inner Asia in order 
to determ ine the location o f  C hina's northern borders (Elliott 2000: 621-4; 
Hostetler 2000: 651-8 ; cf. Huang 2012: 66). Following the assorted walls erected 
during the Ming dynasty, they decided that this constituted the frontier between 
China and Tartary. W here walls were confusing, running in parallel or o ff in the 
wrong direction, the border was clarified and simplified; where walls were entirely 
missing, the Jesuits’ m ap readily supplied them. This was the Great Wall described 
already in the first chapter o f  Jean-Baptiste Du H alde's monumental Description 
giographique, historique, chronologique, politique, el physique de I 'empire de la 
Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise (1736). ‘This celebrated Wall was built by the 
fam ous Em peror Tsin Sh-whang, w ith a political view, 221 years before C hrist', 
Du Halde explained. ‘It bounds China on the north, and defends it against the 
neighboring Tartars’ (D u Halde 1738, 1:20). Du H alde's work was translated into 
English in 1738 and w idely read across Europe, not least by the Enlightenment 
philosophers who had come to greatly adm ire the wisdom and rationality o f  
C hina's governm ent (Rowbotham  1932: 1052). Collaborating with Du Halde, Jean 
Baptiste Bourguignon d 'A nville. Europe's leading cartographer at the time, 
published his Nouvel atlas de la Chine, de la Tartarie chinoise et du Thibet (1737), 
on which the Great Wall was depicted as a  continuous, strong, fortified, northern 
border (Anvillc 1737).
This was not only a cartographical construction but also the way in which 
eighteenth-century Europeans im agined China. The Great Wall explained to 
everyone's satisfaction why China was so prosperous and so powerful. Wealth, 
according to the tenets o f  m ercantilism , the dom inant econom ic doctrine in Europe 
o f  the day, is created through protectionist m easures. A country should accum ulate 
resources -  treasure, people, m inerals, m anufacturing industry, agricultural lands
-  while m inim ising foreign trade and restricting the outflow o f  precious metals. 
This was exactly what the Chinese em pire had done and the Great Wall was one o f
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the m eans to do it. As a result, 'I t  m ay be said, w ithout exaggeration,’ Du Halde 
concluded, 'that China is one o f  the most fruitful, as well as large and beautiful 
countries in the w orld’ (Du Halde 1738, 1: 314).
Having read about the G reat Wall, and having imagined it, the Europeans 
naturally wanted to see it, yet since China was closed to foreigners this feat could 
not easily be accomplished. There were only the lucky few -  such as the m em bers 
o f  a British diplom atic mission led by George M acartney who visited China 
in 1793 -  who were given the opportunity. A fter having presented them selves at 
the court in Beijing, the M acartney mission follow ed the em peror to his sum m er 
retreat in Chengde, in M anchuria, north o f  the wall, and on their way, they were 
thrilled to visit the celebrated construction. ‘I f  the other parts o f  it be sim ilar to 
those which 1 have seen’. M acartney concluded, ‘it is certainly the most stupendous 
work o f  human hands’, and he calculated that its com bined volume was greater 
than that all other fortifications in the whole world and that the m aterial used 
equivalent to that o f  all houses in England and Scotland (M acartney 1807: 243; 
Barrow 1804: 334). The Great Wall provided conclusive proof to European minds 
that China was a powerful em pire and a wise and virtuous nation (Anderson 1797: 
70; Staunton 1797 ,2 :360).
The inordinate attention that the M acartney mission paid to the site seem s to 
have puzzled the Chinese officials who accom panied them. ‘They were astonished 
at our curiosity’, M acartney reported, and ‘appeared rather uneasy at the length o f  
our stay upon it', and ‘alm ost began to suspect us, I believe, o f  dangerous designs’ 
(M acartney 1908: 294). The Chinese m andarins, it turned out, had them selves 
never visited the location. Yet this itself w as hardly surprising. The Great Wall 
was not a  ‘sight’ to be visited and in any case ‘sightseeing’ was a European, not a 
Chinese preoccupation. To educated European travellers, starting at the end o f  the 
eighteenth century, each city, each country, had its sights, carefully described in 
the guidebooks -  the Colosseum  in Rome, Notre Dame in Paris, Parthenon 
in Athens, and so on (A dler 1989: 7 -29 ; Cf. Huang 2012: 74 -7 ). Buildings such 
as these were w hat each country was fam ous for and the sym bols by which they 
were recognised. Thanks to the indefatigable work o f  the Jesuits and the vivid 
imagination o f  European visitors, China now too had its representative symbol, 
and the Great Wall has been on the itinerary o f  visiting foreigners ever since. ‘It’s 
a great w all’, as Richard N ixon observed after visiting the site on 24 February 
1972, during his historic first trip to China (Frankel 1972: 14). ‘It's m ajestic’, as 
Barack Obam a concluded on 18 Novem ber 2009. ‘It rem inds you o f  the sweep 
o f  history, and that our tim e here on earth is not that long, so we better m ake the 
best o f  it’ (H iggins 2009).
How to batter down Chinese walls
In the decades around the turn o f  the nineteenth century, Europe’s view o f  China 
changed dramatically. N o longer the location for rational governm ent and assorted 
wonders, China was, the Europeans now decided, a backward backwater plagued 
by O riental despotism  and the tyranny o f  outdated custom s. Yet this radical
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transform at ion o f  European perceptions had  n ex t to norhing to do with China itself 
and instead everything to do w ith Europe. Above all, it was a result o f  a  radical 
re-evaluation o f  the function o f  walls.
The problem with walls, European liberals now explained, is that they break 
up the world into a m ultitude o f  separate, non-com m unicating, com partm ents. If 
a wall is in the way, and if it is high enough, it is impossible to com m unicate with 
the people on the other side o f  it, or even to see who they are or what they are 
doing. In this way walls make the people on both sides more ignorant than they 
otherwise would be. W hat you cannot sec you cannot inspect, scrutinise o r verify, 
and walls as a result allow' people to hide, to keep secrets and maintain unexamined 
prejudices. Walls block light, they block enlightenm ent; the ‘Heim hides the 
heim lich '. And even if  the wall does not constitute an absolute barrier, it is still 
the case that the authority that controls it can restrict and thereby shape the terms 
o f  the intercourse. Not surprisingly, walls arc much relied on by people and 
institutions eager to limit their accountability. Since a political power which is 
hidden behind a wall is im possible to engage in conversation, it never has to 
explain itself nor provide reasons for its actions. In this way walls contribute to the 
sublim e m ystique o f  power but also, m ore prosaically, to political and economic 
corruption.
By destroying walls, nineteenth-century liberals were convinced, they w'ould 
help spread civilisation. A fter all, exchange assures the free circulation not only o f  
goods and services but o f  everything else which can be moved around -  ideas, life­
styles, institutions, fashions, dream s, desires and am bitions. By picking the best 
or the cheapest o f  what is on offer, we can improve our lives and develop our socie­
ties. Com pare the way the w'alls o f  the cities o f  Europe were being dism antled at 
this time, or the way econom ists, follow ing Sm ith’s lead, all railed against 'custom s 
w alls ', ‘tariffs w alls’ and ‘walls o f  protection '. Free exchange. Lord Palmerston 
explained in the Com  Law debate in the British parliam ent in 1842, leads not 
only to an extension and diffusion o f  knowledge, to mutual benefits and kindly 
feelings, but it m akes m ankind ‘happier, wrise, better’ (Palm erston 1842). ‘This’, 
he concluded, ‘is the dispensation o f  Providence -  this is the decree o f  that powrer 
which created and disposes the universe.’
The problem with China, Europeans now concluded, are the w alls the Chinese 
have built around their country and their minds. The Chinese are inherently a wall- 
building people and there are walls everyw here around natural resources such as 
forests and salt lakes; around every Chinese city, and inside the cities there are 
w alls separating the M anchu and the Chinese sections, but also the m em bers o f  
professional guilds from each other or governm ent officials from the rest o f  the 
population (C hang 1970: 63). Chinese houses are separated by walls and inside 
the houses walls divide family m em bers from each other and inside the rooms 
them selves there arc portable screens made o f  paper and wood. All these walls 
blocked exchange; they blocked access to new and cheaper products but also to 
new ideas, the latest technological advances, medical discoveries and scientific 
breakthroughs, and, European m issionaries added, to the words o f  the Christian 
God (Jam es 1862: 477-554).
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Consider trade. In the nineteenth century1 British m anufacturers were constantly 
on the lookout for export markets for the products that their factories kept spew­
ing out. China, with an estim ated population o f  som e 350 m illion people, was an 
obvious target o f  these efforts. This ‘third o f  m ankind ', British m erchants imagined, 
were all waiting to be supplied with cotton cloth from Lancashire and cutlery from 
Newcastle. The problem was only that the imperial authorities in Beijing refused to 
grant access to foreign merchants. There was only one city -  Guangzhou, ‘C an to n \ 
in the south - where the Europeans could trade, and only during parts o f  the year, 
and even then they were not allowed to enter the city itself. The British demanded 
full access to all cities, all markets, all people, in all o f  China, and in addition to 
selling their British-m ade goods they insisted on the right to sell opium grown in 
British-held India. When the Chinese refused to m ake concessions and began 
blocking the opium trade, the British went to w ar in Novem ber 1839. Three years 
later a peace treaty was concluded in N anjing which opened four more cities to 
the Europeans and turned the barren rocks o f  Hong Kong into a British colony. Hie 
British had wanted more, but they were still overjoyed. ‘[TJhere is scarcely an 
artic le ', Henry Pottinger, the first governor o f  Hong Kong, explained, ‘that the 
m anufacturers o f  England may not supply to them o f  a quality and at a price that 
w ill ensure an alm ost unlim ited dem and' (Gordon 1836: 6). It was inevitable, The 
Times com m ented, that ‘an adventurous m aritime people like the English should 
force them selves into connexion with a feeble and unprogressive race like the 
Chinese, inhabiting a rich country open to our trade' (The Times 1857). ‘China is 
open! Hallelujah, China is open ' (Jam es 1862: 477).
To Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, plotting a revolution back hom e in Europe, 
it w as the opening up o f  China that constituted the best illustration o f  the world- 
transform ing powers o f  capitalism . O nce the search for profits has come to replace 
all other concerns, they argued in The Communist Manifesto, written six years 
after the signing o f  the Treaty o f  Nanjing, all aspects o f  life as we know it will be 
radically transform ed. Capitalism  shapes the world in its own image. The profit 
m otive will destroy feudal relations and replace them with m arket relations; there 
will be constant revolutions, disturbances o f  all social conditions, uncertainty, and 
agitation. ‘The cheap prices o f  its com m odities are the heavy artillery with which 
it batters down all Chinese w alls ' (M arx and Engels 1906: 18). Engels knew very 
well what he was talking about here. A fter all, he fancied h im self a  m ilitary man. 
In a scries o f  articles on the latest developm ents in military ordnance published in 
the New-York Tribune, he had discussed in great detail what form o f  m ilitary 
hardware was required to breach various kinds o f  walls (Engels 1957). Rifled 
guns, he had pointed out, constitute a ‘real revolution ' in battlefield tactics.
Yet Marx and Engels were wrong. Cheap prices were not the heavy artillery 
which in the end battered down the walls o f  China. Instead the walls o f  China were 
battered down by the heavy artillery o f  heavy artillery. Once the Treaty o f  Nanjing 
was signed and the Royal Navy returned home, the Chinese began dragging their 
feet. The imperial authorities, the British governm ent decided, were not living up to 
their obligations, and besides, it w as still the case that the British wanted all o f  China 
open. To do som ething about this unsatisfactory state o f  affairs, Lord Palmerston 
appointed John Bowring as the new governor o f  Hong Kong. Bowring was a
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cfocipie o f Jerem y Benlham ’s, one o f  the original founders o f  the Anti-Corn Law 
League and an activist on behalf o f  various liberal causes (Todd 2008: 381- 2). 
‘England has the highest and most noble o f  m issions’, Bowring had declared at a 
m eeting o f  the League on 13 April 1843, which is ‘to teach the world that comm erce 
should be free -  that all humble beings are made to love and help one another’.
Freedom o f  com m erce, I dare say it, is Christianity in action. It is the m anifest­
ation o f  this spirit o f  kindness, benevolence and love w'hich everywhere seeks 
to distance itself from evil, and tries in all places to strengthen the good.
(Bastiat 1862: 148)
Bowring hated w'alls -  walls around countries, around cities, around prisons, and 
he regularly spoke out against the nefarious influence o f  quarantines. Com ing to 
China he was imm ediately appalled by the ever-presence o f  its walls. Seizing on a 
pretext, he called on the Royal M arine to intervene, and in O ctober 1856, a new' 
w'ar -  the Second Opium War -  had begun. Before long British gunships on the 
Pearl River were shelling the city w alls o f  Guangzhou. Yet w'hen news reached 
Britain regarding the renewed hostilities, Bowring wras criticised in parliam ent and 
Palm erston’s governm ent was eventually forced to resign (R ingm ar 2011 b: 5 -32). 
Lord Derby, a form er Tory prime minister, w as particularly incensed. He reacted 
strongly against Bow ring’s aggressive posture and defended the rights o f  the 
Chinese to their own way o f  life (Derby 1857). How would we like it, Derby asked, 
if  the Chinese started attacking our institutions o f  governm ent. Bowring had a 
‘m onom aniacal obsessions' with the city w'alls o f  Guangzhou: ‘I believe he dream s 
o f  the entrance into Canton, I believe he thinks o f  it first thing in the morning, the 
last thing at night, and in the middle o f  the night if  he happen to awake* (Derby 
1857: 1177).
O nce again peace w as concluded -  the Treaty o f  Nanjing, 1858 -  and this time 
around China was indeed forced to open up to foreign influences and trade. Once 
again defeated, China could no longer control its own borders. C hina’s walls had 
finally com e down, and British-m ade goods, and opium, began flooding in. ‘The 
walls o f  Jericho have fallen flat to the ground’, as an enthusiastic m issionary put it. 
‘The fields are white unto the harvest. W hat is w anted? All that is wanted is, reapers 
to  go and gather it in’ (Jam es 1862: 483). China w as nowf for the first time able to 
receive the blessings o f  civilisation, even if  its culture was destroyed in the process 
(Zeng 1887:3). One o f  the reason why w'e need to build walls, Chinese folklore has 
alw'ays m aintained, is that evil spirits only can m ove in straight lines. Walls will 
stop them . Chinese folklore may have been right about that, but in the 1850s their 
walls were too w'eak and the evil spirits too determined.
Life in the borderland
The Great Wall, we said, understood as a unified structure built for a  given purpose, 
docs not exist. There are many w'alls in China, and bits o f  walls, and rem nants o f 
former w'alls, but they were built for various reasons, at various times, and they
were more than any th ing the  resalt o f  political expediency. Instead the Grcai Wall 
is a social construction erected not in China itself but instead in the m inds o f  
Europeans who alw ays claim ed to know what China was. In early m odem  Europe, 
when China was admired for its w ealth and its political stability, the Great Wall 
w as the perfect symbol o f  the wisdom o f  m ercantilism ; in the nineteenth century, 
when China w as m ocked for its lack o f  progress, the destruction o f  all Chinese 
w alls sym bolised the wisdom o f  exchange. To the Europeans, it is the walling 
instinct o f  the Chinese that com es first and the Great Wall is only its most prominent 
expression. The Great Wall existed because the Europeans decided that it had 
to exist, and before long they had found it everywhere throughout the country-. The 
walls that the Europeans went on to destroy in the nineteenth century- were the ones 
they had created in the eighteenth century. The eventual result o f  this work o f  the 
im agination was an aggressive European posture and a policy o f  imperialism.
This is where the political anthropology o f  walls becom es a m atter o f  some 
urgency. It is only by highlighting the varied functions o f  walls, and the reasons 
why they originally were constructed, that we can hope to influence the policies 
they justify  (R ingm ar 2018). No, we can say, this is not the way walls work; walls 
can never properly be controlled by the people who build them ; w alls always result 
in a num ber o f  unintended consequences. In particular, we can be critical o f  the 
idea that walls can protect a culture. On the contrary, as is obvious to all people 
living by a w all, it not only separates people but also unites them. Walls, that is, 
create a culture o f  their own. A border designates a borderland, an intermediate 
zone in which people on both sides m ay relate to each other far m ore intimately 
than they do to others. The border establishes a shared fate and a com m unality o f 
interest (Lattim ore 1962b: 484). The history o f  the walls o f  northern China pro­
vides an illustration. To be a Chinese border guard in a  desolate fortress som ewhere 
along the O rdos loop was to lead a sad existence. Fighting the M ongols was a 
hopeless task and it made far m ore sense to interact and to trade with them . This 
was also what the border guards ended up doing and there w as nothing whatsoever 
that the officials back in Beijing could do about it (Waldron 1992: 150). In fact, the 
population living on both sides o f  the border were always far more heterogeneous 
than the official, Confucian, ideology acknowledged. There were plenty o f  Chinese 
people who took up a nomadic lifestyle and plenty o f  nom ads who engaged in part- 
tim e farming. M oreover, the nom adic frontier was attractive to m any ordinary' 
Chinese since it allowed them  to avoid the im positions o f  the state and gave them 
opportunities to m ake m oney from sm uggling and trade.
As all nom adic people know, the agricultural m etaphor is sim ply m istaken. A 
culture does not require walls to thrive. A culture does not require roots and it does 
not require a fixed location. Nom ads have a culture o f  their own after all, a culture 
on-the-go that thrives in a shifting landscape. Nom ads carry everything they need 
with them on a road that leads to som ewhere else, and their culture is as mobile as 
their horses and as collapsible as their homes. In addition, nom ads know a thing or 
two about civilisation. After all, it is only through exchange -  voluntary- if  possible, 
if  not forced -  that their way o f  life becom es viable. Connecting societies is what 
nom ads alw ays have done -  most spectacularly, no doubt, by the M ongols who
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m aintained and protected the caravan routes -  ttre "Si Ac RoacT -  which connected 
China with India, India with Central Asia, and Central Asia with the M iddle Fast 
and Europe. In this respect nom ads are sim ilar to the 'barbarian hordes' w'hich 
today are said to ‘overrun* Europe. W henever we are forced to deal with the alien, 
we are forced to open up to the world and invited to see ourselves in the context 
o f  others (Horvath et al. 2015; Szakolczai 2017). The result, if  the invitation 
is accepted, is civilising, but civilisation, we can conclude, does not equal the 
imposition o f  foreign solutions on a defenceless society. The form idable trading 
network that the M ongols created could be used by anyone, for w hatever purpose, 
and it was by means o f  this bridge that Europe, in the M iddle Ages, itself w(as 
civilised. A world without walls, the nom ads will tell us, is not an abstract, formless, 
empty’ space; it is a  world o f  paths, o f  places to discover and possibilities to explore.
Notes
1 I am grateful to James C. Scott for comments and suggestions.
2 The latest news on the official Chinese Internet policy is available at httpi//chinadigital 
timcs.nct/china/intcmct-control/
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